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AN EX-ANTE VIEW OF THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS:
INDUCING PARTIES TO DRAFT REASONABLE TERMS
Omri Ben-Shahar∗

Abstract
This paper focuses on one type of ex-ante effect of the battle of the
forms: the incentive to draft reasonable boilerplate terms. It argues that
the experience with the battle-of-the- forms rule under the CISG
reinforces what we already know, that existing legal solutions do not
provide any incentive for the parties to draft reasonable forms. The paper
suggests that the goal of inducing parties to draft reasonable terms can be
significantly promoted by a third rule, a variant of the “best-shot” rule
proposed by Victor Goldberg. Under the version labeled the “reasonableshot” rule, the court would resolve the battle of the forms by choosing
the form that contains the more efficient terms. The paper proposes some
guidelines how the “reasonable shot” could be identified by the court,
and argues that there are good reasons to expect that this regime would
give parties the incentive to draft reasonable terms. In fact, it is plausible
that under this rule the parties’ forms would converge and the battle of
the forms would cease to exist.
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INTRODUCTION
The “Battle of the Forms”, one of the oldest problems in modern contract
law, is widely recognized to be among the most difficult problems for
contracts doctrine to resolve. In the U.S., the rules governing the battle of
the forms have been famously labeled “chaos”. 1 Commentators, judges,
and legislators, continue to view the battle of the forms as a problem that
has not lent itself to a conceptually satisfactory solution. 2
Improving the law’s solution to the battle of the forms is a task that is
very much on the agenda of current contract law. The Section governing
the battle of the forms in the Uniform Commercial Code (“the Code”), 2207, is perhaps the most litigated section in contract law, 3 and a
landmark battlefront during the amendment proceeding of Article 2.4
Similarly, the enactment of Section 19 of CISG, whic h governs the battle
of the forms in international sales of goods, involved a similar prolonged
debate, bringing to the fore the different conceptual solutions to this
everyday commercial problem. 5
A striking feature of the debates over the battle of the forms is how little
it has been influenced by the economic analysis of contract law. Apart
from a few interesting exceptions, the vast literature on the battle of the
forms—and I’m not referring to the strictly doctrinal inquiries—takes a
1

John Murray labeled the law on the battle of the forms “chaos” and concluded
recently that the over time it has only exacerbated. See Murray, The Chaos of the Battle
of the Forms: Solutions, 39 Vand. L. Rev. 1307 (1986) (hereinafter, “Murray, Chaos I)
and Murray, The Definitive “Battle of the Forms”: Chaos Revisited, 20 J. L. & Comm.
1, 47 (2000) (hereinafter, “Murray, Chaos II);
2
“Legal science has not yet found a satisfactory way to decide what the parties have
agreed when they have consummated a transaction on the basis of the routing exchange
of inconsistent terms.” See JOHN HONNOLD, UNIFORM LAW OF INTERNATIONAL SALES
UNDER THE 1980 UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION 228 (2d Ed. 19__).
3
W HITE & SUMMERS, 1 UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE (4th Ed. 1995); Murray, Chaos II,
supra note 1, at 4 (Section 2-207 “belies what has become the most complex and
controversial section of the entire Uniform Commercial Code”)
4
James J. White, Contracting Under Amended 2-207, 2004 Wisc. L.Rev. __
(forthcoming).
5
The United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods, Apr.
11 1980, 52 Fed. Reg. 40, 6264 (1987), 19 I.L.M 668 (1980) [hereinafter CISG], art 19.
For an account of the legislative debates over Section 19, see Christine Moccia, The
United Nations Convention on Contracts for the International Sale of Goods and the
“Battle of the Forms,” 13 Fordham Int’l L. J. 649 (1989).
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distinctly ex-post perspective, searching for solutions that would best
identify the bargain- in- fact of the parties, eliminate undue hardship and
surprise, avoid arbitrary biases, reduce litigation costs, and provide a fair
compromise. 6 While some of theses perspectives are “economic” in the
sense that they address efficiency issues (e.g., how efficient are the terms
that courts can supply7 ), they primarily take an ex-post efficiency view.
Their scope is: given the divergence between the parties’ forms, how to
minimize social waste.
In most other areas of contract law, the main added value of economic
analysis is the understanding of how legal rules shape the incentives to
draft contracts and to behave prior to a dispute, that is, the ex-ante
effects. Remedies, for example, are viewed as incentives to invest and
perform contracts; 8 Gap-filler are viewed as incentives to economize on
drafting and share information prior to performance; 9 and the rules
governing offer-and-acceptance are viewed as incentives to
communicate and to invest in the negotiations. 10 With few exceptions,
the literature on the battle of the forms did not accord the ex-ante effects
equal attention.
The analysis in this paper seeks to contribute to the study of one type of
incentive that may be influenced by the battle of the forms rules: the
incentive to draft terms in a way that is more or less self-serving to the
drafter. True, this is still not the type of primary ex-ante behavior that
economists are most interested in explaining—e.g., quality of products
and their price. But even an understanding of how primary economic
variables are affected by the rule would be incomplete without an inquiry
as to how the secondary terms—those over which battles of the forms are
mounted—are designed.

6

See, e.g., Ostas and Leete, Economic Analysis of Law as a Guide to Post-Communiste
Legal Reforms: The Case of Hungarian Contract Law, 32 Amer. Bus. L. J. 355, 381-82
(1995).
7
See, e.g., Note, Demilitarizing the Battle of the Forms: A Peace Proposal, 1990
Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 553, 570.
8
See, e.g., Edlin, Breach Remedies, in 1 The New Palgrave Dictionary of Economics
and the Law 174 (P. Newman, Ed., 1998).
9
E.g., Goetz and Scott, The Limits of Expanded Choice: an Analysis of the Interactions
Between Express and Implied Contract Terms, 75 Calif. L. Rev. 261 (1985).
10
See, e.g., Avery Katz, The Strategic Structure of Offer and Acceptance: Game
Theory and the Law of Contract Formation, 89 Mich. L. Rev. 215 (1990).
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The analysis of the ex-ante effects begins by looking at the time period in
which the forms—having been drafted earlier—are exchanged between
the parties. The argument here is not new: both theoretically and
practically, there is little reason to expect that the battle of the form rules
would do much to affect the incentive to read the other party’s terms. In
fact, some new support for this view comes from observations regarding
the practices under the CISG. The paper identifies an interesting
ambiguity regarding the resolution of the battle of the forms under the
CISG, which is consistent only with the premise that form terms are
utterly disregarded at the contracting stage. Thus, the paper joins
previous voices that argued that legal policy should focus on the second
type of incentive—the incentives to draft reasonable terms.
Previous literature recognized that battle of the forms rules could shape
the incentives to draft form terms. In an insightful article, Baird and
Weisberg argued that the common law’s formalistic “last-shot” rule
provides superior incentives for the parties to draft moderate provisions
that are mutually beneficial. 11 Expecting the some of their counterparts
would read and reject one-sided terms, parties would draft forms that are
acceptable to such “readers.” In Section III of the paper, after explaining
this argument, I will join others before me in doubting whether this
effect is robust. I will argue that neither of the two standard solutions—
the “last-shot” rule of common law and the “knockout” rule of sales
law—provides any meaningful incentive to write moderate terms.
Because the incentives to draft moderate terms is the focus of this paper,
a natural question to ask is whether a different rule might generate better
incentives than existing solutions. Accordingly, the paper will analyze in
detail a third and less familiar rule that has the potential to create more
powerful ex-ante incentives to draft reasonable terms. This rule, the
“reasonable shot rule”—a variant of which was previously identified in
an original paper by Victor Goldberg and labeled by him the “best-shot”
rule 12 —would require the court to enforce the form containing the more
reasonable terms. The court cannot concoct its own reasonable
compromise; nor is it obligated to choose the form that was
11

Douglas Baird and Robert Weisberg, Rules, Standards, and the Battle of the Forms:
A Reassessment of §2-207, 68 Va. L. Rev. 1217, 1252-57 (1982).
12
Victor Goldberg, The Battle of the Forms: Fairness, Efficiency, and the Best-Shot
Rule, 76. Ore. L. Rev. 155 (1997) (proposing that courts would choose the fairer of the
two nonconforming forms.)
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presumptively “accepted.” Instead, the court must choose one of the two
forms, that which is more reasonable. This approach resembles the wellknown final-offer arbitration procedure (FOA), often used in labor
bargaining to determine salaries, 13 in which each side submits its
position and the arbitrator must choose one of the two positions which
she considers to be closer to the underlying “correct” or ideal resolution.
This procedure has a well-documented effect of moderating the parties’
demands and inducing settlements, and similar dynamics can arise under
the reasonable-shot rule, providing a powerful inducement for parties to
draft their forms ex-ante in a more reasonable manner. In fact—this
argument will be developed below—the incentives to moderate could be
powerful enough for the parties’ forms to converge, and “in equilibrium”
the battle of the forms would cease to exist.
However, for the reasonable-shot rule to succeed in inducing parties to
change their drafting habits and to write reasonable terms, courts must be
able to apply this standard and identify the more reasonable form in a
predictable fashion. Accordingly, the analysis in the paper explores
various criteria that were not explored before, which may be utilized in
implementing this standard. The objective of the analysis here is to
examine whether courts are institutionally capable of identifying the
more reasonable terms.
The paper is structured as follows. Section II sets up the different
solutions to the battle of the forms. The two familiar solutions—the
“last-shot” rule and the “knockout” rule—are presented briefly; the less
familiar solution of the “reasonable shot” rule is presented in more detail.
Section III then discusses the ex ante effects of these three rules, with
particular emphasis on contract drafting. Section IV concludes.

II. THE BATTLE OF THE FORMS : SOLUTIONS

13

A notable application of FOA is baseball’s salary arbitration. It is well documented
that the application of FOA causes parties’ positions to converge, increasing the
incidence of settlement, and rendering the final outcome more tolerable even for the
losing side. For accounts of baseball’s FOA experience, see Roger Abrams, THE
M ONEY PITCH : BASEBALL FREE A GENCY AND SALARY A RBITRATION (1990); John L.
Fizel, Play Ball: Baseball Arbitration After 20 Years, 20 Disp. Resol. J. 42 (1994).
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A. The Problem
The problem known as the battle of the forms is common. Businessmen
discuss a transaction and agree—orally or through written
communications—on the performance terms of the deal, e.g., price,
quantity and description of goods, payment terms, perhaps one or two
other provisions. In the course of exchanging these communications, or
in the course of formally memorializing the terms orally agreed upon
over the phone, the parties exchange forms that contain additional
“lawyers’ terms” concerning non-performance contingencies, usually
governing the scope of warranty, limitations on remedies, forum
selection, and the like. These forms, each of which was pre-drafted by
legal council in a manner favorable to the party using it, rarely agree.
The seller’s form, for example, would usually include a boilerplate
disclaimer of warranties and a significant limitation on damages,
whereas the buyer’s form would either require some expanded warranty
or entitle the buyer to a generous measure of consequential damages.
When the battle of the forms is discovered (and adjudicated) prior to
performance or to any type of conduct that indicates the existence of a
contract, the question is whether the communications formed a contract.
Here, the old common law “mirror-image” rule, which established that a
contract never formed, 14 was reformed under the Uniform Commercial
Code’s (“the Code”) §2-207(1). The Code adopted the view that a
response can manifest acceptance even if it contains terms that are not
matching. 15 Yet this type of battle of the forms—a pre-performance
dispute over the existence of a contract—is not very likely to reach
courts. It is usually a wiser business strategy for a party to seek other
contracts than to engage in a lawsuit over hypothetical losses suffered
from the breakdown of a relationship that never actually budded.
The far more common battle of the forms dispute occurs after parties
have performed the contract, or have otherwise engaged in conduct that
indicates the existence of a contract. Here, the question is not whether a
contract exists (it obviously does), but rather what are the contract’s
terms. Usually the parties have exchanged at least two forms—a
purchase order by the buyer followed by an acknowledgment or an
14

See Poel v. Brunswick, 110 N.E. 619 (1915) for the strict application of this result,
but compare to A.B.Small Co. v. American Sugar Ref. Co., 267 U.S. 233 (1925), which
adopts a more lenient approach. This rule was adopted by the CISG art. 19(1).
15
White & Summers, supra note 3, at 8.
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invoice from the seller (or vice versa: a price quote from the seller
followed by a purchase order)—only to realize, after delivery and
payment have been made, that the forms differ with respect to a
contingent term that, as it happens, turned out to matter a lot.
Determining the content of the contract is the problem that the law has to
resolve.
B. The “Last-Shot” Rule
Under the traditional common law approach known as the “last shot”
rule, adopted by the CISG, the mirror- image rule implies that each form,
by virtue of having some different terms relative to the previous form,
cannot be deemed an acceptance and thus must be regarded as a
“counter-offer.” A counter-offer is treated in most legal systems as a
“bundle” of two legal effects: a rejection of the previous offer and the
making of a new outstanding offer. 16 Thus, since each form rejects its
predecessor and since rejection terminates the offer, the only form that is
not affirmatively rejected and can potentially be accepted is the last form
in the sequence, and its terms govern.
This solution, while formally preserving the offer/acceptance module as
the only template of contract formation, is far from satisfactory. For one,
contract law is usually stricter in recognizing silence as acceptance of
terms. 17 Nothing in the conduct of the parties indicates that the last shot,
or any other shot, includes the acceptable of boilerplate terms. Indeed,
the symmetric passivity of each party regarding the other party’s form
may be equally consistent with the opposite construction, namely a
“first-shot” rule. 18 Of course, both the first-shot and the last-shot rules
16

See Restatement 2d of Contracts § 39; CISG art. 19(1).
In a merchant-to-merchant context, a silent party is viewed as accepting an offer only
when he made prior affirmative indications that the terms of the offer are desirable, by
course of dealings or by soliciting the offer. See Cole-McIntyre-Norfleet Co. v.
Holloway, 214 S.W. 817 (Tenn. 1919) (solicitation of offer ); Hobbs v. Massasoit Whip
Co., 33 N.E. 495 (Mass. 1893) (course of dealings); James J. White, Autistic Contracts,
45 Wayne L.Rev. 1693, 1702-03 (2000).
18
There is non-trivial support to the idea that the party whose response to an offer
contained non-matching terms, if he did not receive an affirmative acceptance yet
proceeded to perform, should be deemed to have agreed to the terms in the offer. See,
e.g., Honnold, supra note 2, at 237-238; Valtrol, Inc. v. General Connectors Corp. 884
F. 2d 149, 155 (4th Cir. 1989) (discrepant terms in the acceptance are to be ignored). In
practice, under one interpretation of 2-207(2), this “first shot” rule applies any time the
response includes “different” terms that are not “additional.” See White and Summers,
17
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are equally fictitious: in the presence of symmetric non-acceptance, both
“break the tie” according to the same methodology, namely, both
construe the chronological order of the forms to be crucial. This
chronology account, which from the perspective of the parties is mostly
irrelevant, can have the adverse effect of inducing the parties to keep
sending counter-forms in the hope of firing the last shot. 19
C. The “Knockout” Rule
Modern sales law has increasingly distanced itself for the common law’s
last-shot tradition. Recognizing that business entities that exchange
standard fo rms rarely read the lawyers’ terms on the back of their
counterparts’ forms (or, if they read, do not regard silence as acceptance
of the last shot), the Code sought to eliminate the arbitrariness attached
to the last shot rule. Surely, if people do not read and compare the backof-the- form terms, and if the forms are drafted in advance without regard
to any particular transaction, the presumption that the first form was
“rejected” and “expired” and that the last form was “accepted” is
detached from both common sense and commercial reality. 20
Accordingly, Section 2-207 of the Code sought to restore greater
symmetry to a formation process that the common law would otherwise
irrationally bias towards the last form. It did so utilizing the so-called
“knockout” rule of Section 2-207: material provisions over which the
forms disagree are knocked out. 21 The existence of conflicting terms is
taken as mutual rejection, regardless of which was communicated first.
As a result of this mutual rejection, the contract contains a gap.

supra note 3, at 12-14. This interpretation, however, is re jected by most courts. See
Daicom, Inc. v. Pennwalt Corp., 741 F.2d 1569, 1578-79 (10th Cir. 1984).
19
See, e.g., Goldberg, supra note 12, p. 159 (“the parties have an incentive to jockey
for position so as theirs is the last shot”); but see Baird and Weisberg, supra note 11, at
1252 (arguing that such prolonged battle of the forms is unlikely.)
20
See also UNIDROIT Principles of International Commercial Contracts, art. 2.22, cmt
3 (1994) (parties “will normally not even be aware of the conflict between their
respective standard terms. There is in such cases no reason to allow the parties
subsequently to […] insist on the application of the terms last sent or referred to.”)
21
This is, of course, an oversimplification of §2-207’s language, which courts and
commentators have been laboriously deciphering for the past forty years, but it is
consistent with the practice followed by most courts. See White & Summers, supra
note 3, at 10-19. Under amended 2-207, the scope of the knockout result is
strengthened. As it drafter, James J. White explained, under the amended provision,
there is no precedence by virtue of timing, “the second record has the same power as
the first.” See White, supra note 4, at __.

7
Published by University of Michigan Law School Scholarship Repository, 2004

9

Law & Economics Working Papers Archive: 2003-2009, Art. 32 [2004]

Accordingly, the Code supplements the gaps with its usual statutory gapfiller and, where applicable, with immanent business norms.
The Code’s seemingly neutral solution is, however, far from a split-thedifference compromise. Once the parties’ conflicting terms drop out, the
Code’s gap-fillers are often significantly closer to the buyer’s form terms
than to the seller’s. For example, when the buyer’s warranty term and the
seller’s disclaimer of warranty drop out, the Code’s gap-fillers include an
ever-expanding warranty of merchantability and an express warranty
arising from any affirmations of fact the seller may have made orally in
the course the parties’ communications (which, under the Code’s weak
version of the parol evidence rule, are often admissible.) The result is
therefore quite favorable to the buyer, at times identical to the warranty
term the buyer’s form included originally. Similarly, when the buyer’s
remedy terms and the seller’s limitations on remedies drop out, the gapfillers are the generous remedies available to the buyer under the Code,
including consequential damages.
Parties—and sellers in particular—may try to change this knockout/gapfilling result by drafting a ‘mine and mine only’ clause, usually stating
that the seller is only willing to transact under his terms, and that the
buyer’s acceptance of the goods would constitute acceptance of the
seller’s form terms as well. However, when the buyer’s form includes
non- matching terms, the seller’s terms still get knocked-out, along with
the ‘mine and mine only’ clause. 22 Like the last-shot rule, there is not
much either party can do under the Code to escape the effect of the rules
governing the battle of the forms. 23 Unless the seller is willing to prolong
the negotiation process in attempt to reach express assent (and thereby
also risk a breakdown of the deal), he must live with the terms as chosen
by the Code.
D. The Battle of the Forms under the CISG
The CISG does not provide an innovative solution to the battle of the
forms. Still, it is worth examining the state of the law under the CISG, as
it can shed some light on the discussion of the ex-ante effects of the
rules. Article 19 of the CISG adopts the mirror- image rule: a reply that

22

See, e.g., Boise Cascade Corp. v. Etsco, 39 UCC Rep. Serv. 410 (Ore. 1984).
But see Farnsworth, Contracts 168 (4th Ed. 2004) (a seller can avoid the knockout
rule by rejecting the buyer’s form and calling his form a “counter-offer”.)
23
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adds new or different material terms is a counter-offer, not acceptance. 24
Article 18(3) of the CISG provides that acceptance may be manifested
by conduct, such as payment for, or shipment of the goods. 25 The
combination of the mirror- image rule of Article 19 and acceptance by
conduct of Article 18(3) gives rise to the last-shot rule. 26
In practice, however, battles of the forms in contracts for international
sales of goods do not receive a simple uniform treatment. In actual cases,
courts refuse to apply the last-shot rule that the convention mandates,
and instead apply the knockout rule. This defiance occurs, so it seems,
whenever the contract is adjudicated by courts whose domestic law
utilizes a version of the knockout rule, such as the U.S. and German
courts. 27 Thus, although the language of the CISG clearly adopts one
rule, disputes are adjudicated under a different rule, and reach a result
opposite to the one mandated by the statute. For example, when a seller
fired the last short with a form disclaiming liability and significantly
limiting remedies, a court in Germany nevertheless held that since this
conflicted with the buyer’s term, the implied warranty of merchantability

24

Art. 19(3) lists terms that are presumed to be material, which include warranty,
disclaimer, force majeure, remedies, and arbitration clauses. Thus, most of terms that
give rise to battles of the forms are presumed material.
25
Art. 18(3) provides, in part: “the offeree may indicate assent by performing an act,
such as one relating to the dispatch of the goods or payment of the price.”
26
See, e.g., Murray, Chaos II, supra note 1, at 44-45; KRITZER, GUIDE TO THE
PRACTICAL APPLICATIONS OF THE UNITED NATIONS CONVENTION OF CONTRACTS FOR
THE INTERNATIONAL SALE OF GOODS 184 (1989) C.M. BIANCA & M.J. BONELL,
COMMENTARY ON THE INTERNATIONA SALES LAW : THE 1980 VIENNA SALES
CONVENTIONS 179 (1987).
27
For the doctrinal debate whether courts ought to apply domestic law, see Moccia,
supra note 5, at 673-74 (1989) (if the issue is contract validity, art. 4(a) should apply,
instructing the court to refer to domestic law.) There are many examples in case law for
the rejection of the last-shot rule. For an American case, see Chateau Des Charmes
Wines Ltd. v. Sabate USA Inc., 328 F.3d 528 (Ninth Cir. 2003); In Germany, the
Supreme Court recently held that “where the CISG applies, […] according to the
(probably) prevailing opinion, partially diverging general terms and conditions become
an integral part of the contract (only) so far as they do not contradict each other; the
statutory provisions apply to the rest.” See VIII ZR 304/00 (English translation in
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/wais/db/cases2/020109g1.html ); Peter Schlechtriem,
Battle of the Forms in International Contract Law (English translation in
http://www.cisg.law.pace.edu/cisg/biblio/schlechtriem5.html).
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and the statutory remedies apply. 28 Similarly, a U.S. court facing a battle
of the forms contest concerning a forum selection clause applied the 2207 knock-out rule while recognizing that the case is governed by the
CISG, conveniently stating that the CISG would reach the “same
conclusion” as the Code. 29 The resistance in U.S. courts to the CISG’s
mirror image methodology is quite prevalent. 30 Generally, and consistent
with this loyalty-to-domestic-rules observation, courts rarely cite CISG
decisions from other countries. 31
This uncertainty concerning the prevailing rule can be seen as highly
problematic. If parties cannot ascertain upfront which rule will be
applied to a potential battle of the forms, they also cannot predict which
form or which terms would apply. Don’t parties have to know these
matters in order to correctly adjust the dickered terms, specifically the
price? Wouldn’t a seller need to know which warranty term applies to
the transaction when pricing the goods? Under the CISG, even if the
seller fired a last shot that included warranty disclaimers, he might end
up liable under an implied warranty of merchantability, pasted into the
transaction as a gap- filler by an American court applying the knockout
rule.
D. The “Reasonable Shot” Rule
1. The Rule
Arbitrators are well familiar with the procedure of final offer arbitration
(FOA), which works in the following way. Consider baseball’s salary
arbitration, where FOA has been widely and successfully used. When a
player is committed to play for a specific team but the player and the
team are unable to agree on a salary, each party submits a proposal to the
arbitrator, who must then choose one of the two proposals—the one that
is closer to what she considers as the most appropriate salary. The
arbitrator cannot come up with a third, in-between figure. She may hear
arguments by the parties why one proposal is more reasonable than
28

VIII ZR 304/00, id.; Larry DiMatteo et al., The Interpretive Turn in the International
Sales Law: An Analysis of Fifteen Years fo CISG Jurisprudence, 24 Nw. J. Int’l L. &
Bus. 299, 352-53 (2004).
29
Primewood, Inc. v. Roxan GMBH,
WL 1777501 (D.N.D.)
30
For example, in Claudia v. Olivieri Footwear,
WL 164824 (S.D.N.Y.), the court
resisted the application of CISG art. 8(3) rule that acceptance of delivery, without
further communication, manifests acceptance of the terms in the last shot.
31
DiMatteo et al, supra note 28, at 357.
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another, but must eventually pick one of the two. 32 Her decision on how
much a player ought to be “valued” is based on comparing the player to
other players, according to the various performance statistics and factors
specified in the collective bargaining agreement.
The battle of the form can be approached in a similar fashion. In line
with a proposal first made by Victor Goldberg, 33 under the reasonableshot rule the court’s role would be to select the form that contains the
more reasonable terms. 34 Like FOA, the court must choose only between
the parties’ forms, and cannot devise any “third” option. This is in
contrast to the knockout rule, where the court can import provisions not
found in either form. It differs from the first shot and the last shot rules
since the court has to choose not according to the chronological order of
forms, but instead in the order of their reasonableness. The court chooses
the lesser of two “evils”, not the latter of the two.
The determination which form is more reasonable can be broken down
into the different matters that the forms regulate—warranties, remedies,
forum selection, etc.—with the more reasonable term coming not always
from the same form. Under such issue-by-issue procedure, the
reasonable shot is not necessarily one party’s integral form, but might be
an assembly of different fragments from the overall totality of the terms
both parties drafted. As contrasted with the “package” approach, that
restricts the court to choose one of the forms in its entirety, the issue-byissue format reduces the risk that parties face and increases the ability of
the court to tailor a most reasonable set of provisions. 35 And as will be
argued below, it further sharpens the incentives to draft terms in a

32

For studies of baseball’s FOA, see sources cited in note 13, supra.
See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 166.
34
The reasonable-shot rule proposed here is somewhat different than the best-shot rule
proposed by Goldberg, id. Goldberg’s version requires courts to pick the fairer of the
two forms, whereas the analyzed here requires courts to pick the more reasonable of
the two forms. While Goldberg, throughout his article, also refers to the form that is
“more reasonable,” his criterion differs in that it focuses on the fairness of the terms and
proposes the approach of the “Golden Rule” to determine comparative fairness. The
analysis here, in contrast, focuses on the efficiency of the terms and offers different
criteria to determine comparative efficiency. See text accompanying notes 38-43, infra..
35
See Elissa Meth, Final Offer Arbitration: A Model for Dispute Resolution in
Domestic and International Disputes, 10 Am. Rev. Int’l Arb. 383, 394 (1999).
33
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reasonably moderate fashion, because it would be impossible to “sneak”
an unreasonable term into an otherwise reasonable package. 36
2. “More Reasonable Terms”
Can a court determine which party’s terms are more reasonable? Finaloffer arbitration has been successful in resolving disputes over salaries,
where each party submits a numeric figure and where market
comparisons exist to determine which figure is more reasonable. 37 Can
the same technique succeed in resolving disputes over terms that are not
easily quantifiable, and where exact parameters are not available?
At times, one party’s terms may be so unreasonable that courts would
find it easy to choose the other party’s form. In fact, they already
conduct such scrutiny under other doctrines, so no new adjudicatory skill
would be required. 38 Thus, for example, if each party states a different
arbitration provision, one requiring to arbitrate at a remote location or in
any fashion that imposes a significant cost and the other picking a natural
and accessible arbitration forum, it is easy to compare and determine that
the latter is more reasonable. Or, if each party drafts a different remedy
provision, one a reasonable estimate of the loss and the other includes a
limitation that undermines the purpose of remedies, again it is standard
practice for courts to strike down the one that is less reasonable.
36

Goldberg argues that an all-or-nothing approach, looking at each form in its entirety,
is essential for assessing the overall fairness of the package. See supra note 12, at 166.
Arbitrators, however, see merit in the issue-by-issue procedure. See Robert Howlett,
Interest Arbitration in the Public Sector, 60 Chi.-Kent L. Rev. 815, 831-33 (1984).
37
Even in baseball arbitration—the most successful implementation of FOA—it is not
clear how to determine the salary the player merits. While there are many useful
players’ statistics, comparison requires subtle judgment on part of arbitrators, e.g., how
senior can the comparable group of players be, how to value non-wage or contingent
wage provisions, which of the many categories of production to use, etc. See Abrams,
supra note 13, 157-164. The FOA technique has also been proposed in many other
areas of dispute that pose difficulties of determining what is the most reasonable term.
See, e.g., Meth, supra 35 (applying FOA to disputes over contract damages); Christian
Henrich, Game Theory and Gonslaves: A Recommendation for Reforming Stockholder
Appraisal Actions, 56 Business Lawyer 697 (2001) (arguing that FOA can apply to
disputes over share value in freeze -outs.)
38
For courts’ scrutiny of the reasonableness of limitations on remedies, see, e.g., UCC
2-719 cmt 1 (“reasonable agreements limiting or modifying remedies are to be given
effect”); Murray v. Holiday Rambler, Inc., 265 N.W.2d 513 (Wisc. 1978). For courts’
scrutiny of reasonableness of forum clauses, see, M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shore Co.,
407 U.S. 1 (forum selection clause is enforceable unless it is “‘unreasonable’ under the
circumstances”); see also Brower v. Gateway 2000, 246 A.D. 2d 246 (NY 1998).
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Often, a particular term in one party’s form—say, a term governing the
procedure for modification—has been followed in prior dealings
between the parties, elevating its stature to be part of the “agreement,”39
thus rendering it reasonable. In fact, courts already take such factors into
account when determining whether an additional term on the counterform exhibits a material difference. 40 For example, when a limitation of
remedy clause is deemed reasonable, it is considered immaterial under 2207(2). 41 So here too, the inquiry necessary to determine the
reasonableness of a term is one that courts are accustomed to make.
From an efficiency perspective, a term is more or less reasonable
depending on whether it increases the overall value of the transaction or
merely shifts value in zero-sum, or negative-sum fashion to its drafter. A
provision that requires a seller to warrant goods is more reasonable when
the seller is the most effective monitor of the quality of the goods or if he
is the least cost avoider or repairer of defects. The same provision is less
reasonable when it is the buyer who can best protect the asset against
malfunctions, or who has superior information about nonconformities. 42
Or, a provision that entitles a negligent party to indemnification is
unreasonable when it undermines the incentives to take care. 43
Generally, terms that serve a productive cost-saving purpose, as opposed
to merely rent-extraction, are presumptively reasonable.
Additionally, the reasonableness of a term depends on whether or not the
cost saving that it brings its drafter was shared, ex ante, with the other
party. When a seller disclaims warranties or limits the buyer’s remedies,
the term is nevertheless reasonable when the saving from it was shared,
through a lower price, with the buyer. For example, if a seller disclaims
39

“Agreement” is defined by the Code to include all past practices. See UCC 1-201(3).
See, e.g., GUIDE TO PRACTICAL APPLICATION OF THE CISG 172 (1993).
41
UCC 2-207 cmt. 5 (examples of terms that incorporated in the contract unless
objected to include clauses “limiting remedies in a reasonable way”); See also
Hydraform Prods. Corp. v. American Steel & Alum. Corp., 498 A. 2d 339, 343 (N.H.
1985).
42
See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1250.
43
A similar inquiry is often conducted under UCC 2-207 (2)(b) to determine whether
terms in the response constitute a material change. The main criterion in this inquiry is
the “hardship” imposed by the terms in the response. Thus, for example, courts have
held that sweeping indemnity clauses impose undue hardship. See Maxon Corp. v.
Tyler Pipe Indus., Inc., 497 N.E.2d 570 (Ind. 1986).
40
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any liability for goods lost in the course of shipment, this term is more or
less reasonable depending on whether the buyer was offered the
opportunity to purchase a more expansive liability coverage but opted for
the cost-saving alternative. Similar to the law of unconscionability, even
an extremely pro-seller term can be reasonable if the buyer chose it out
of a menu of options.
Recall that under the Code’s gap-filling methodology, courts are asked to
perform an even more exacting task, of picking the reasonable terms on
their own. The Code’s gap-fillers are sometimes not much more than
standards of reasonableness, requiring courts to figure out “reasonable
duration” of warranties, “fair average quality,” etc. If we believe that
courts can potentially draft terms that are reasonable, wouldn’t they also
be able to tell which of the contesting terms is more reasonable?
Moreover, the issue-by- issue format is a way in which the determination
of the more reasonable form can be broken down rather than made in a
0-1 fashion. In situations in which it is difficult to determine which form
is more reasonable, the court can balance the number of issued decided
in favor of each party.
3. Examples
Duration of Warranty. In Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Industries, 44 the
forms of the parties disagreed over the duration of the warranty for
electronic boards. The seller’s form contained a 3- month warranty term;
the buyer’s form contained a warranty with no time limit. The buyer first
inspected the goods after six months, and upon discovering defects
rejected the goods and sought remedies. The court knocked out the
discrepant warranty terms and filled the gap with a warranty for
“reasonable” time. 45 The court did not have to designate a specific
duration as the most reasonable; it merely decided that the six months it
took the buyer to invoke the warranty was reasonable. The buyer won.
Under the reasonable-shot rule, the court would have likely reached a
different resolution, in favor of the seller. The court would not need to
designate an intermediate duration, nor to evaluate whether six months
was reasonable. It would only have to determine which of the two terms,
three months or unlimited duration, is more reasonable. However long is
44

29 F. 3d 1173 (7th Cir. 1994)
The trial court relied on UCC §2-309 which allows buyer to reject non-conforming
goods within a reasonable time.
45
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the reasonable period for a buyer to test the goods, it must be closer to
three months than to the unlimited duration the buyer allotted itself. For
goods that are assembled into a larger system and sold downstream to
users that the seller cannot monitor, it would unreasonable to require the
seller to provide free lifetime warranty (or even the 4- year duration
permitted under the statute of limitation, §2-725). If the boards can first
be inspected for defects, a reasonable warranty would cover only the
inspection period. 46 A three months period for inspection, while stingy,
is not unmanageable and thus not unreasonable.
Note, interestingly, that in a dispute like this, the buyer wo uld lose even
if he attempted the rejection one day past the three- month term. Under
the current regime, it would suffice for the buyer to show his inspection
occurred within a reasonable time and, surely, one more day does render
the rejection period unreasonably long. Under the reasonable-shot rule,
in contrast, the buyer would not be able to argue that his actual timing is
reasonable; he would have to show that his contractual term—unlimited
duration—is more reasonable. Even if his actual conduct is reasonable, a
party to such a dispute would be unable to overcome the
unreasonableness of its contractual boilerplate term.
Disclaimer of Warranty. A very common battle of the forms occurs
between a seller who disclaims all implied and express warranties and a
buyer who either is silent or includes a warranty of merchantability
clause similar to UCC 2-314. For example, in Roto-Lith v. Bartlett,47
seller sold glue to be used by the buyer to seal spinach bags. The glue
failed. Was the seller’s disclaimer reasonable? Of course, the answer
depends on various case-specific factors such as the seller’s knowledge
of the buyer’s needs, the ability of the buyer to test the glue or to
anticipate difficulties in using it, how the glue was used, etc’. The point
here is not that one party’s term is universally more reasonable; rather,
the point is that reasonableness can be ascertained by looking at factors
that are verifiable at trial. In that case, commentators perceive the
disclaimer by this seller as reasonable. 48 Notably, in writing on this case,
Grant Gilmore opined that “it would have been outrageous to have

46

See UCC 2-607(3).
297 F.2d 497 (1st Cir. 1962).
48
See Baird and Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1250-51, for analysis of the Roto-Lith
case and the factors that suggest that a disclaimer of warranty is reasonable.
47
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saddled the seller with warranties which (as the buyer knew) he had
expressly (and quite reasonably) disclaimed.”(Emphasis added) 49
Arbitration. What about the othe r common battle of the forms, where
one party’s form (usually the seller’s) includes an arbitration term and
the other party is either silent on forum selection or includes a different
arbitration term? Arbitration has many advantages that normally make it
a reasonable, cost-saving choice. But it is also occasionally designed to
prevent buyers from obtaining a practical remedy. When, say, a filing fee
is unreasonable given the stakes, or when the arbitration forum is
geographically inaccessible, or when either the procedure or the
substantive rules of the arbitration forum exclude a reasonable remedy,
courts can—and already often do—strike down the arbitration clause as
unreasonable. 50 To show that the arbitration clause is unreasonable, a
party can identify an existing alternative that is more accessible and
reasonable. In the same way that negligence in torts can be demonstrated
by focusing on untaken precautions, unreasonableness in contract
drafting can be shown by reference to un-drafted alternatives.
Consequential Damages. Finally, consider a battle between the seller’s
term which limits damages for defective goods to not exceed the contract
price versus the buyer’s term which expands damages to include all
consequential losses. Neither of these terms is first-best. The seller’s
term, by excluding all expectation losses, sets damages too low; the
buyer’s term, by including unforeseeable and unpreventable components
of the loss, sets damages too high. Courts cannot realistically conduct a
direct comparison of social welfare under these two terms. However, the
buyer’s term may be deemed reasonable if some of the idiosyncratic
facts that affect his losses were communicated to the seller explicitly. An
unread boilerplate term in the buyer’s form is not adequa te
communication; an oral statement concerning the buyer’s needs is. Thus,
the buyer would lose because he did not choose the reasonable medium
to alert the seller to his special circumstances and thus did not give the
seller an opportunity to price the added liability.

49

Letter of Grant Gilmore to Robert Summers, cited in White, supra note 4, at __.
See Brower v. Gateway 2000, 247 A.2d 247, 255 (NY 1998); Matter of Teleserve
Sys. [MCI Telecommunications Corp.], 230 A.D.2d 585, 594 (NY 1997).
50
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III. ANALYSIS OF EX-ANTE EFFECTS
A. Incentives to Read
The first type of incentive that may be affected by the rules governing
the battle of the forms is the incentive to read the fine print in the other
party’s form. Of course, reading terms in standard form contracts is
costly. It is plausible, in fact quite likely, that the social value of such
increased incentive does not justify the cost. But even without
conducting any cost-benefit analysis of the incentive to read, 51 it is not
clear if there can be much variance across the different rules with respect
to the incentives to read.
Consider first the last-short rule. Here is a plausible conjecture: under the
last-shot rule, parties would have a more powerful incentive to read the
terms prior to performance. 52 If, say, the seller fired the last shot, the
buyer—realizing that the seller may try to sneak in terms unfavorable to
buyer—would have the incentive to read the terms in the seller’s invoice
before silently accepting them, to verify that he is willing to proceed
under the seller’s terms. He might decide, after reading, that he is better
off taking his business elsewhere, or perhaps insisting on some offsetting
concessions from the seller. 53 In contrast, under the knockout rule,
neither party would have such an incentive to read. Under this rule, each
party expects that even if the other party drafted selfish terms, they will
drop out and would not be part of the contract. Thus, there is no gain to
reading and raising havoc upfront.
It is far from clear that the last-shot rule would indeed provide the added
incentive to read. The actual ritual of contracting—of exchanging forms
51

For such analyses in a consumer context, see Avery Katz, Your Terms or Mine: The
Duty to Read Fine Print in Standard Form Contracts, 21 Rand J. Econ 518 (1990);
Clayton Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 Wisc. L.Rev. __
(forthcoming).
52
See, e.g., Ostas and Leete, supra note 6, at 378 (1995) (last shot rule “provides an
incentive for business actors to carefully read and discuss al the contract terms”); Baird
and Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1257 (“the seller knows that at least some buyers will
be careful enough to read the seller’s form.”)
53
The premise that at least some buyers have the incentive to read underlies the
economic analysis of consumer standard form contracts. See, e.g., Schwartz & Wilde,
Intervening in Markets on the Basis of Imperfect Information: A Legal and Economic
Analysis, 127 U. Pa. L.Rev. 630, 638 (1979); Kornhauser, Unconscionability in
Standard Forms, 64 Calif. L. Rev. 1151 (1976).
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and accepting shipment—is conducted by “underlings” of seller and
buyer who sit in their offices with a telephone and a stack of form
contracts drafted by their lawyers. 54 In large firms doing hundreds of
transactions, these contracting agents do not have the institutional
training nor the authority to read and dicker with the lawyers’ terms, and
they rarely have the capacity to trade away a particular boilerplate term
for a more favorable price. 55 In fact, they often don’t even read or
remember their own boilerplate terms. 56 Are these the agents who are
going to read their counterparts’ fine print terms? Even if an innovative
organization were to authorize its sales agents to read and negotiate the
warranty and arbitration terms, these agents would likely be dealing with
counterpart agents who are only authorized to deal on a take- it-or-leaveit basis. In any event, reading is futile. 57
One may nevertheless wonder whether a change in the legal regime, say
from the knockout rule to the last-shot rule, or perhaps to the reasonableshot rule, would bring about a change in contracting practices and would
challenge more organizations to train their sales and purchasing agents to
read, process, and adjust boilerplate terms. Aside from the wellrehearsed observations concerning the economic value of unread
contracts in a mass-transaction economy, there is little reason to expect
that such an effect could take place. For one, there are existing
jurisdictions that have long applied a last-shot regime and yet do not
exhibit a more prevalent practice of reading printed terms. 58 And if
parties don’t read the last shot under the last-shot rule, there is even less
reason to expect that they would do so under any other rule, particularly
the reasonable-shot rule. Apathy to each other’s boilerplate terms is not a
54

White & Summers, supra note 3, at 6-7.
See, generally, Stuart Macaulay, Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A
Preliminary Study, 28 Amer. Soc. Rev. 55 (1963); Murray, Chaos I, supra note 1, at
1317, 1373; Gregory Travalio, Clearing the Air after the Battle: Reconciling Fairness
and Efficiency in a Formal Approach to UCC 2-207, 33 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 327, 330
(1983).
56
See Macaulay, id., at 59.
57
See Daniel Keating, Exploring the Battle of the Forms in Action, 98 Mich. L.Rev.
2678, 2699-2700 (2000) (reporting survey results that confirms that parties rarely read
the form terms prior to the transaction.)
58
See, e.g., Report of the Secretary-General: Formation and Validity of Contracts for
the International Sale of Goods, 10 U.N. Commission on International Trade Law 29,
U.N. Doc. A/CN.9/128 (1977) (“the employees of both parties will rarely, if ever, read
and compare the printed terms. All that is of importance to them are the terms which
have been filled in on the forms”)
55
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result of a calculated conclusion that those term matter more or less
depending on the legal regime. Rather, it is a manifestation of the
attitude that it is not the fine print that matters, but the bargain in fact
between the parties.
This conclusion—that agents are not sensitive at all to the legal rules
governing the battle of the forms—is reinforced by the experience with
the battle of the forms under the CISG. As noted above, while the CISG
clearly designates the last-shot rule, in practice courts often apply the
knockout rule. There is no indication, however, that any of this
ambiguity concerning the law affects in any way the contracting
practices of the parties. It might be puzzling, how do parties enter
contracts for sales of international goods without the ability to predict
which rule would govern the battle of the forms and which terms would
prevail. Isn’t the battle of the forms rule as important to the parties as it
is to legal scholars and reformers? Apparently, this rule—and the fate of
the boilerplate terms that the parties exchange—does not seem essential
to the businessmen and their agents who negotiate the dickered terms. At
the time of exchange of communications and performance of the
contract, the divergence in boilerplate terms is often neither addressed
nor recognized, and the agents behave as if they are not concerned with
the potential dispute resolution rules or remedies. Those who are part to
the deal are interested in assent over the performance terms. For these
agents, the fate of the terms in fine print is, at the time of contracting,
insignificant.
Accordingly, if the rules governing the battle of the form can have any
incentive effects, they must be aimed at the lawyers of both parties,
operating in the background in drafting the forms. These are the parties
who indirectly “negotiate” the boilerplate terms, who care about their
contingent application, and who can anticipate the impact of the battle of
the forms rules on the enforceability of these terms. Indeed, hornbooks
are replete with suggestions for practitioners on how to draft their
contracts given the different consequences that courts might attach to
various drafting techniques. 59 That is, lawyers who draft the fine print
are the “true” rivals in the battle of the forms. A successful solution to
the battle of the forms would give these role players an incentive to reach
mutual assent—to design forms and boilerplate terms that agree.
59

See White & Summers, supra note 3, at 31.
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B. Incentives to Draft
1. The Last-Shot Rule versus the Knockout Rule
The battle of the forms is the result of a reality in which many of the
“legal” aspects of a deal are not affirmatively negotiated. Because the
principals negotiating the deal are interested only in the performance
terms, and because the organizational structure of each party usually
requires it to utilize forms to memorialize the terms of the deal, there is
an opportunity for both sides to insert one-sided terms which would
likely escape the other party’s scrutiny and would, with some likelihood,
secure a benefit. In fact, not only is there an opportunity to use one-sided
form terms, there is a clear incentive to do so. The risk that these
boilerplate terms will be detected and influence the other party’s
willingness to deal is usually minor.
How do existing solutions to the battle of the forms fair with respect to
the incentives to draft? Here is another conjecture: under the last-shot
rule, parties would have a more powerful incentive to draft reasonable
terms. 60 At the drafting stage, each party would recognize that the more
one-sided its form, the more likely is the other party to reject it and
respond with a counter offer. Thus, to reduce the chance of rejection, an
offeror would want to draft more moderate terms, to the mutual interest
of both parties. 61
It is unlikely, however, that this “moderation” conjecture is robust. 62 For
one, it is based on the premise that a recipient reads the terms of the offer
and decides, ad-hoc, after evaluating the substance of these terms,
whether or not to respond with its own counter-offer. But, as argued
above, parties rarely read the boilerplate terms in the forms, not even
their own. The practice of sending a counter-form—a purchase order,
invoice, and acknowledgment—is a matter of standard business practice,
60

See, Baird and Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1252-57 (“under the mirror-image rule,
each party has an incentive to hypothesize the terms that the parties would have settled
upon had they dickered over them.”)
61
Some have argued that even if terms are read only by a fraction of transactors, there
is enough incentive for drafters to draft more balanced terms. See, e.g., Schwartz &
Wilde, supra note 53, at 638; but see, Gillette, supra note 51, section II.B, for analysis
of some weaknesses in this argument.
62
For another skeptical account, see Goldberg, supra note 12, at 164-5.
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which Judge Posner called “a thoughtless use of boilerplate form.”63
Recall: the fundamental business logic of using standard forms is to save
the transaction cost of customized terms and of complex precontractual
adjustments. It is the same business logic that suggests that even if one
were to moderate its own terms, this would not affect the terms in the
response. And without such benefit, the strategy of moderation is not
likely to be employed. The overwhelming incentive under the last-shot
rule is to draft self- interested forms and to try and sneak them in as late
as possible prior to performance. Indeed, parties often perform the
transaction while continuing to send forms back and forth, making it
further difficult to ascertain who fired the last shot.
Similarly, under the Code’s knockout rule, parties do not have any
incentive to moderate their standard form term. From the buyer’s
perspective, the knock out result is quite desirable, as it opens the door to
the Code’s pro-buyer gap- fillers such as warranties, consequential
damages, a limited list of sellers’ excuses, and no arbitration. For the
buyer, then, the risk of engaging in a battle of the forms is not much of a
deterrent: he is often equally happy to be governed by the Code’s gapfillers as by his own form provisions. He has no incentive draft terms in
a way that might avoid a battle of the forms. For the seller, in contrast,
the battle of the forms is more costly. To avoid the dilemma of either
accepting the buyer’s form or knocking it out and importing the Code’s
gap fillers, the seller might try to induce the buyer to accept the seller’s
terms, perhaps by drafting a less one-sided form, more acceptable to the
buyer. But as long as the buyer has nothing to lose by using its own
form, there is no reason for the seller to expect that any restraint on his
part would prevent a battle of the forms, and thus no clear reason to draft
moderate provisions. As White & Summers soberly conclude, if a seller
wants to limit liability and cannot get the buyer to agree, all he can do
“ex-ante,” after having an extra martini every night, is to shrink the
capitalization of the firm. 64
In sum, the reason that the battle of the forms remains an acute problem
under both the last-shot and the knockout rules, and that parties regularly
continue to draft forms in a self-serving manner, is that these regimes do
not provide any incentive for the parties to draft reasonable terms. When
the lawyers draft the boilerplate provisions, either generally to fit all
63
64

Northrop Corp. v. Litronic Indus., 29 F.3d 1173, 1179 (7th Cir. 1994).
White & Summers, supra note 3, at 31.
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transactions or specifically tailored to a particular deal, they have no
motivation to draft terms that are mutually beneficial. Rather, the intraorganizational pressure is to think one-sidedly. 65 Occasionally, when
these selfish terms are exposed and turn out to be deal breakers in the
bargaining, special accommodations can be made. But in the majority of
situations, the terms are only discovered ex post facto, at which point
they can only benefit their drafter.
2. The Reasonable-Shot Rule
The reasonable-shot regime attaches a substantial cost to the strategy of
drafting unreasonably self-serving forms, and it potentially provides
incentives for the parties’ forms to converge. 66 When parties expect the
court to enforce their terms only if they are more reasonable than the
terms of their counterparts, there is a powerful incentive to draft these
terms in a reasonable, less one-sided manner. This is independent of
whether a party expects its form to be accepted by the other party, or
even to be read by the other party. The reason a party would be induced
to draft terms that are more balanced and reasonable is not the
expectation to be rewarded for it in the negotiation stage, nor the
expectation that it would translate into higher willingness to pay by the
other party. It is the expectation that the more reasonable the form, the
more likely are its terms to be enforced, ex-post. The incentive this rule
gives is founded on the recognition that the true battle-of-the- forms
interaction is between the drafters of both forms, the two “legal
departments” that don’t necessarily negotiate with each other. Each
drafter would be induced to change its drafting strategy because of the
fear that its counterpart would do the same and come out with the upper
hand, in the contest over which form more reasonable. 67
Eventually, it can be imagined that the dynamics under this rule are such
that a race to the middle would take place. 68 Even if each party only

65

See Avery Katz, On the Use of Practitioner Surveys in Commercial Law Research,
98 Mich. L.Rev. 2760, 2769-70 (2000) (discussing intra-firm tensions between lawyers
and sales agents that might explain the one-sided drafting of the forms.)
66
See Goldberg, supra note 12, at 166 (the “best-shot” rule gives each side an incentive
to move towards the center.)
67
In an interview, some in-house counsel noted that best-shot rule might cause contract
drafters to rethink their current drafting strategies. See Keating, supra note 57, at 2711.
68
The race to the middle under a FOA procedure is well recognized. See, e.g., Stern et
al., FINAL OFFER A RBITRATION : THE EFFECTS OF PUBLIC SAFETY EMPLOYEE
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wants to draft terms that are incrementally more reasonable than the
other party’s terms, it also realizes that the other party would try to do
the same. It is a familiar equilibrium in contests that have these dynamics
for both parties to align themselves in the middle. 69 In the present
context, the more predictable the court’s view of what constitute
reasonable terms, the closer the parties’ terms would be to it, and the
practice of drafting biased terms would cease. And if the courts’ position
on reasonableness is known with certainty, the equilibrium involves both
parties drafting identical forms, representing a reasonable majoritarian
compromise. The solution to the battle of the forms could have the
paradoxical effect of eliminating the battle of the forms from arising in
the first place. At the very least, it brings the parties forms closer
together, with each party being less satisfied with its own form but more
satisfied with the opponent’s form. 70
The “race to the middle” described above depends, of course, on whether
parties can anticipate what courts would view as a reasonable “middle.”
In salary arbitration, this convergence may fail when parties are
uncertain about the arbitrator’s preferred settlement. 71 The greater the
uncertainty, the weaker the incentive to submit a more reasonable
position. Still, even in these circumstances, where the rule does not
guarantee convergence, it provides more powerful incentives for
moderation than other rules. The reason is simple: under this rule, a
party’s decision to draft a concession, however costly it is when the
concession is adopted into the contract relative to a contract without such
a concession, is at least partially offset by the new benefit, in terms of the
greater chance of winning the battle of the forms. When this endogenous
benefit is accounted for, even significant concessions have only minor
impact on this party’s expected profit.72
BARGAINING 144 (1975) (providing empirical evidence that FOA moderates the
submissions of opposing parties);
69
ROBERT GIBBONS, GAME THEORY FOR APPLIED ECONOMICS 23-26 (1992) (when
parties have perfect information, their positions converge).
70
For example, when a dispute between the IRS and Apple Computers over tax debt
exceeding $100 million was resolved by FOA, both parties declared themselves
winners. See After Successful Use of Baseball Arbitration, Apple, IRS Both Declare
Themselves Winners, 11 Alternatives to High Cost Litigation 163 (1993).
71
See Steven J. Brams, NEGOTIATION GAMES: A PPLYING GAME THEORY TO
BARGAINING AND A RBITRATION 71-75 (1990)
72
See Jay Coleman et al, Covergence or Divergence in Final-Offer Arbitraion in
Professional Baseball, 31 Industrial Relations 238, 244 (1993).
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Nevertheless, the more predictable the reasonableness standard, the more
likely are parties to race to the middle. If there is a broad spectrum of
what parties’ perceive as reasonable (or, what they believe courts would
view as reasonable), the parties would be relatively safer in drafting
terms at conflicting ends of this spectrum. As the spectrum narrows, the
reasonable shot rule would generate more powerful incentives for the
parties’ forms to converge. Thus, the critical factor for this rule to
succeed is the ability to predict the court’s position. This, of course,
depends on whether courts’ determination of what constitute reasonable
terms is principled and informed. If comparative efficiency is the
yardstick utilized to determine reasonableness, I highlighted above
several factors that should be looked at, and argued that courts are in fact
already familiar with the relevant inquiries.
Of course, for the reasonable shot rule to generate predictable outcomes,
it is not enough that courts follow a well-defined methodology in
comparing the parties’ forms, the y must also have the information and
institutional capacity to conduct accurate comparisons. Given the
existing experience, it is probably easy to come up with examples for
battles of forms in which it is impossible to determine comparable
reasonableness. On the basis of these examples, it would be tempting to
conclude that courts do not have the information necessary to compare
reasonableness and that the rule would lead to indeterminacy, rather than
to convergence. However, we should keep in mind that the difficulty in
determining reasonableness is endogenous to the legal regime. Under the
reasonable shot rule, parties would have a greater incentive submit
evidence to show that their terms are more reasonable. In the same way
that baseball’s FOA introduced new ways of measuring players’
contribution to their teams’ success, such that did not exist before the
procedure was launched (and recall: baseball already had many statistical
ways of measuring productivity), 73 the rule can induce parties to provide
information that would help measure the reasonableness of terms. 74 For
73

In baseball arbitration, FOA “focuses the parties’ presentations [so that] each side
must explain to the tribunal why the player is worth more or less than the midpoint.
[Experts] have devised complex formulae […] to describe a player’s contribution to his
club’s success.” See Abrams, supra note 13, at 156-7.
74
In the context of appraisal of minority share value in freeze-outs, Chancellor Allen
of Delaware discussed the merits of FOA in improving the quality of information
available to courts. See Cede & Co. v. Technicolor, Inc., No. CIV.A.7129, 1990 Del.
Ch. LEXIS 259 (Del. Ch. Oct. 19, 1990); Henrich, supra note 37, at 701, 715.
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example, courts might learn that a particular provision is reasonable in
light of intra- firm concerns, information currently deemed irrelevant.
Further, even if there would be some initial uncertainty as to what courts
regard more reasonable terms, over time a body of jurisprudence and
precedents would accumulate and make subsequent adjudication easier
and more predictable. 75 Since parties on the same side of the transaction
divide use similar terms, the different types of substantive battles that
arise is limited. This is particularly true in e-commerce. 76 Whether it is a
battle between warranties versus disclaimers, limitations versus
consequential remedies, arbitration, or any other common frontier, the
patterns of dispute are fairly limited and, as happened in baseball
arbitration, the parties can learn to anticipate courts’ decisions. 77
Thus, the incentive to draft reasonable terms under the reasonable-shot
rule could emerge gradually. Initially, when there is still much
uncertainty among transactors as to what terms are more or less
reasonable, this regime will not generate convergence. But over time, as
the information courts acquire improves and as accumulating case law
identifies categories of unreasonable terms, parties would learn not to
draft certain one-sided terms. These dynamics would potentially persist
as long as the criteria for reasonableness are coherent and are capable of
yielding deterministic outcomes.

IV. CONCLUDING R EMARK

75

See Baird & Weisberg, supra note 11, at 1246 (arguing that disputes over the
meaning of “material,” while frequent in the early years of the Code, would decrease as
the likely outcome of litigation becomes predictable).
76
Under increasingly prevalent technologies, contract terms are standardized and
electronically tagged, often exchanged between computers. See, e.g., Margaret Jane
Radin, Humans, Computers, and Binding Commitment, 75 Ind. L.J. 1125, 1130 (2000).
77
In baseball arbitration, when FOA was initially invoked, arbitrators did not have a
clear reference on how wages should correspond to statistical measures of performance
and how to relatively weigh the different factors. For example, arbitrators had a
difficulty applying factors that are more subjective, such as the player’ crowd appeal or
spontaneity. It is only over time, with the accumulation of precedents and comparable
cases, that the formula for reasonable wage became more obvious and that a
quantitative yardstick became known. See Abrams, supra note 13, at 165.
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Even if the analysis in this paper is correct and the reasonable-shot rule
provides superior incentives to draft efficient boilerplate forms, there
remains a conceptual problem that the paper did not address. Recall that
for the reasonable shot rule to succeed, courts must be able to determine
which terms are more reasonable. But if courts are capable of doing so,
why not simply have the courts substitute the parties’ forms with what
they deem as most reasonable? Why not endorse a regime in which the
most reasonable terms govern, dictated by court regardless of whether
one party happened to draft a form that reflects them? That is, instead of
reaching this outcome indirectly, implementing it gradually through an
incentive scheme that requires parties to guess the courts’ position,
courts can regulate it directly and immediately (and allow parties to opt
out of it only through consented form.)
This question implicates a more fundamental observation concerning the
Code’s gap- filling methodology. In a sense, under the existing knockout
rule courts already do as suggested, substitute the parties non- matching
terms with the perceived most reasonable gap- fillers. The problem, as I
argued in the paper, is that these gap-fillers are not quite so reasonable.
Being so rigidly favorable to buyers, the Code’s gap-fillers do not mimic
a hypothetical bargain—they do not represent what parties who want to
maximize their surplus would rationally agree upon. The problem, then,
is not with the battle-of-the-forms rule that knocks out both parties’
terms, but with the content of the gap- fillers that take their place.
Still, even if the Code’s gap- fillers were more efficient and better
tailored to substitute the parties’ conflicting terms, the reasonable-shot
regime could be advantageous. For one, it places a less exacting burden
on courts: picking the more reasonable term is easier than drafting the
most reasonable one from scratch, especially so when one party’s term is
distinctly unreasonable. Moreover, the reasonable-shot rule strengthens
contract as an institution privately regulated by the parties, rather than
publicly dictated by the court. Even if the term governing the transaction
is the same as it would be under the gap- filling regime, under the
reasonable shot rule the enforced term is privately tailored. Finally, and
perhaps most importantly, the reasonable shot rule encourages parties to
help courts in identifying the reasonable terms. By drafting terms into
their standard forms and by arguing ex-post why their terms ought to be
enforced, parties provide courts with a stronger factual basis for the
determination, potentially improving its accuracy.
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